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Although readers of Reason Papers are no doubt familiar with Allan
Gotthelf’s extensive efforts aimed at a more widespread appreciation of Ayn
Rand’s philosophical thought, he is best known among historians of
philosophy and science for his contributions to the understanding of
Aristotle’s biological works, which have shed much light on Aristotle’s
scientific methodology, epistemology, and metaphysics. Two new books
allow us to take account of Gotthelf’s contributions to Aristotelian studies.
The first is a collection of Gotthelf’s most important papers on Aristotle.1
Although the papers were written independently, there is little superfluous
repetition, and taken together they constitute a comprehensive and coherent
account of Aristotle’s biology and its philosophical significance. The second,
which has its origin in a 2004 conference in Gotthelf’s honor, is a collection
of papers on Aristotle, most of which focus on themes that Gotthelf himself
has discussed.2 Some of the papers further his thought, taking it in new
directions; others depart from Gotthelf in philosophically interesting ways.
Gotthelf believes that one of his most important contributions to
Aristotelian studies lies in his account of teleology in the biological writings.
For this he gives credit to Rand (p. viii) (who personally led Gotthelf to the
study of Aristotle), for she had argued that scientific explanation must identify
potentials inherent in natures. This was in contrast to the predominant
empiricist strategy of taking explanation to be a matter of subsuming an
1

Allan Gotthelf, Teleology, First Principles, and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s
Biology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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James. G. Lennox and Robert Bolton, eds., Being, Nature, and Life in Aristotle:
Essays in Honor of Allan Gotthelf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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observed phenomenon to observed regularities.
The second major
contribution that Gotthelf understands himself to have made in the area of
Aristotelian science is having worked with James Lennox to show how,
appearances to the contrary, the explanations to which the biological treatises
are intended to lead, and that Aristotle offers in a partial form, conform to the
general structure of demonstration as laid out in Aristotle’s Posterior
Analytics. A crucial impetus behind all of Gotthelf’s work in Aristotle’s
biology can be found in the pioneering work of David Balme, who set the
example of closely reading the biological works with an eye to what Aristotle
is actually up to within them, as opposed to reading them with an eye to
seeing how they conform to common presumptions of what Aristotle is doing.
Fittingly, Gotthelf’s collection is dedicated to the memories of both Rand and
Balme.
In the first essay of Teleology, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final
Causality,” Gotthelf works through the interpretation of Aristotelian teleology
with which he is most commonly associated: Aristotle’s view is that in order
to explain a feature of a natural substance, one must appeal to an “irreducible
potency for form.” On this account, the functioning or development of a
biological organ, for example, cannot be explained on the basis of underlying
material or chemical processes alone. Rather, one must appeal to the nature of
the organic whole of which it is a part. This is not, as other scholars have
suggested, a concession to the pragmatic aspects of explanation, or to the
nature of the human mind and its dealings with the world; the potential being
actualized is a feature of reality over and above the material constituents that
underlie it. Gotthelf supports his reading with a close analysis of the relevant
texts. This essay is essential reading, as it is the best defense of the traditional
reading of Aristotle as positing irreducible biological natures.
The traditional interpretation of Aristotelian teleology is, however,
more robust than that of Gotthelf, for it takes the actuality correlative to an
irreducible potentiality to be something of value, a good. This might seem to
be an unwarranted importing of normative notions into natural science, but, as
Rand puts it, “every ‘is’ implies an ‘ought.’”3 The ought dimension of things
is found in the actuality; to say that a being or state is a natural actuality is to
say that there ought to be that being or state toward which a nature is oriented.
(For Rand, the relevant actuality for a human being is life itself; for Aristotle,
it is living well, a full actualization of the relevant potentialities.) But when
we call such a state or being good, are we saying anything more? Gotthelf
says no. In effect, his Aristotle is an ethical reductionist, defining ethical
terms on the basis of non-normative notions. Such a view, which has obvious
repercussions for Aristotelian metaethics, has come under sustained (and, I
think, justified) criticism from those who take Aristotle to hold that the
attributes of the divine intellects in some sense manifest goodness over and
above their being actual, and to take other actualities to be good insofar as
3

Ayn Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” in Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness (New
York: Signet, 1961), p. 19.
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they approach the attributes of divinity. The second essay, “The Place of the
Good in Aristotle’s Teleology,” presents Gotthelf’s forceful rejection of the
traditional reading, in defense of his more minimalistic account of the
interface between Aristotle’s metaethics and his biology.
There follows a series of essays that take aim at those interpretative
strategies that bring Aristotelian biology in line with contemporary biology,
by taking material interactions and movement to be sufficient for necessitating
the actualization of biological form (even if, for pragmatic or psychological
reasons, explanatory accounts must refer to natural potentials and forms).
Gotthelf’s general response to these lines of interpretation is found in the
volume’s third essay, “Understanding Aristotle’s Teleology.” Two more,
“Teleology and Embryogenesis in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals II.6” and
“What’s Teleology Got to Do With It? A Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s
Generation of Animals V” (co-authored with Mariska Leunissen), present
close readings of passages from Generation of Animals, which offers an
account of conception and gestation that has sometimes been thought to
support interpretations incompatible with the “strong irreducibility” that
Gotthelf advocates. Gotthelf’s essays here do not constitute the last word, as
Aristotle’s meaning is underdetermined by the text, but they are essential
works for those seeking clarity in regard to Aristotle’s position concerning the
irreducibility of biological form.
Another challenge to the interpretation of life in Aristotle as an
actualization of an irreducible potential derives from Aristotle’s recognition of
the phenomenon of spontaneous generation, a phenomenon thought to occur
when a living being arises out of material constituents that happen to be
disposed in an appropriate manner, even though no parent imparting form is
present. Gotthelf subjects Generation of Animals 3.11 to a close reading and
argues (contra Lennox) that even in the case of spontaneous generation there
is an actualization of an irreducible potentiality, that which is found in “vital”
heat. In the case of spontaneous generation, vital heat is not species-specific.
Unlike other varieties of biological generation, the nature of being that results
from that irreducible potential results from contextual factors.
The following chapters concern the underlying logical structure of
scientific explanation in Aristotle. “First Principles in Aristotle’s Parts of
Animals” argues that the apodeixeis (demonstrations) to which Aristotle refers
in Parts of Animals 1 are, indeed, demonstrations that conform to the
requirements of the Posterior Analytics. Parts of Animals has as its ultimate
goal biological demonstrations that proceed from first principles concerning
morphological parts, not the species to which those parts belong. Aristotle
begins that work with a discussion of the general characteristics of each part,
and then distinguishes their differences, with an eye to explaining those
features, general and specific, that result from the essential features of those
parts. Gotthelf convincingly shows how the sorts of explanations that are
offered, such as the account given of why ruminants have multiple stomachs,
conform to the formal requirements of canonical demonstration. This project
is furthered in the next essay, “The Elephant’s Nose: Further Reflections on
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the Axiomatic Structure of Biological Explanations in Aristotle,” in which
Gotthelf shows how a particular explanation appeals to first principles that
concern generic and analogical unities at various levels, a scheme more
complicated than but not fundamentally different from that envisaged in the
Posterior Analytics. (This result is confirmed by the evidence collected in
Chapter 8, “Notes towards a Study of Substance and Essence in Aristotle’s
Parts of Animals 2-4.”) Gotthelf’s attempt to reconcile the Posterior
Analytics with Aristotle’s own biological practice has been the occasion for
some words of caution,4 but his account is now generally accepted.
Another major methodological issue raised by Parts of Animals 1
concerns the role to be played by the successive division of generic kinds by
their differentiae. Lennox has shown how it has a crucial role to play in a preexplanatory stage of science, clarifying which features and facts require
explaining.5 Gotthelf complements this by showing how division is at work
within the very process of working through explanations. The differences
within a genus are appealed to in accounting for the differences among those
attributes that are to be explained. References to the generic differences
ensure explanatory completeness.
“A Biological Provenance: Reflections on Montgomery Furth’s
Substance, Form, and Psyche: An Aristotelian Metaphysics” is an
appreciation of and retrospective essay on Furth’s groundbreaking work, 6
among the first to emphasize the importance of biology for Aristotle’s
metaphysics. Gotthelf cautions that the account of substance that Furth
presents presupposes only rudimentary background knowledge in biology.
The biological works offer a much more complex and sophisticated account of
certain issues (such as that of the unity of definition) than that offered within
the Metaphysics. Gotthelf suggests that Furth had missed opportunities to
integrate the philosophical insights of Aristotle’s biological and metaphysical
works. For example, Gotthelf suggests that his own irreducibility thesis is the
key to understanding the metaphysical thesis of the unity of substantial form.
In showing how Aristotle aims at explanation of the features of parts,
Gotthelf has done much to help jettison the once common consensus that
Aristotle’s biological works have the classification of biological kinds as an
ultimate or intermediate goal. One passage in History of Animals 1.6, in
which Aristotle refers to the megista genē (very large—or highest—kinds)
4

See especially G. E. R. Lloyd, “The Theories and Practices of Demonstration,” in G.
E. R. Lloyd, Aristotelian Explorations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), pp. 8-37.
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James G. Lennox, “Divide and Explain: The Posterior Analytics in Practice,” in
Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 90-119.
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Montgomery Furth, Substance, Form, and Psyche: An Aristotelian Metaphysics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
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seems, however, to support the attribution to Aristotle of a classificatory
project. That passage is subjected to scrutiny in two chapters: “DataOrganization, Classification, and Kinds: The Place of the History of Animals
in Aristotle’s Biological Enterprise” and “History of Animals I.6 490b7491a6: Aristotle’s megista genē.” Gotthelf concedes that here Aristotle does
seem to be grouping together kinds of organisms, as opposed to parts of
organisms, but his appeal is to commonly recognized pretheoretical
groupings. The establishment of such groups is not the aim of the treatise, and
any such pretheoretical classification will need to be revised in light of a
theoretical account of the varieties of faculties of soul.
Prior to a “coda,” “Aristotle as Scientist: A Proper Verdict,” which
offers a nontechnical overview of Aristotle’s achievement in biology, the
volume concludes with discussions of the impact Aristotle had on two other
biologists. “Historiae 1: Plantarum et Animalium” asks whether the results
Gotthelf and others have arrived at in their study of Aristotle’s biological
writings can be applied to the botanical writings of Aristotle’s student and
colleague Theophrastus. The verdict is that it can. In Historia Plantarum,
Theophrastus lays out the differences among the kinds of plants. Like
Aristotle, he does so with an eye to discovering and organizing a body of
explanations of those differences. Both scientists left their project far from
complete, but Aristotle made more progress than Theophrastus. “Darwin on
Aristotle” considers Darwin’s letter to William Ogle, in which appears the
famous line “Linneaus and Cuvier have been my two gods, though in very
different ways, but they were mere school-boys to old Aristotle” (p. 345).
Recent scholars have suggested that because Darwin knew little of Aristotle,
the letter offers polite words but no evidence of a real intellectual encounter
with Aristotle’s biological writings. Gotthelf explores the implications of
evidence within that letter to the effect that, in the few pages of Ogle’s
translation of Aristotle that Darwin read prior to his death, Darwin recognized
that Aristotle was on his way to a workable scheme of biological
classification, and that Darwin approved of Aristotle’s attempts to explain the
nature of biological parts on the basis of their function.
A full appreciation of Gotthelf’s achievement can be gained not only
through close study of his own works, but also through those of other
specialists in Aristotelian studies, who are both in debt to his work and take
his lines of inquiry in new directions. Being, Nature, and Life in Aristotle:
Essays in Honor of Allan Gotthelf collects the work of such Aristotle scholars.
Although not all of the essays bear directly on the themes Gotthelf has
explored, all of them are well worth study by those with an interest in
Aristotle.
David Sedley’s “Teleology: Aristotelian and Platonic” follows
Gotthelf in understanding final causation in Aristotle as a matter of the
actualization of irreducible potentialities. He shows how this has an
antecedent in the cosmological thought of Plato. For Plato, the purposiveness
that gives direction to the actualization of these potentialities is found in the
providential order within a divine intellect. Aristotle rejects this and,
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accordingly, dispenses with the belief in cosmic creation. As noted above,
Gotthelf downplays the importance of those passages in which Aristotle
suggests that the actualization of living potentials are “good” insofar as they
approach the characteristics of the divine. Sedley takes such language more
seriously. Teleologically organized beings of different kinds strive for
different actualizations; all are good, but the better ones more fully share in
the characteristics of God. Sedley also differs from Gotthelf in regard to the
scope of teleological structures in Aristotle. As Gotthelf interprets Aristotle,
the self-perpetuating structures and order found in the world have their root in
the individual potentialities for individual substances. Higher-level order,
whether at the cosmic or the social levels, results from individuals’ pursuit of
goals proper to them, alone. Sedley here defends the view he has argued for
elsewhere,7 namely, that Aristotle takes teleological causation also to be at
work globally, on a scale larger than that of the individual structure. Here too,
Sedley suggests, Aristotle is following the lead of Plato.
In Metaphysics Z.17, Aristotle identifies substantial form as the
cause of the fact that some matter constitutes a particular substance. The
standard take is to identify biological form (as a biological principle) with
substantial form (as a metaphysical principle). On this account, the biological
explanation of why there is this particular biological substance is a more
determinate form of the question “Why is there this substance?” Gotthelf’s
approval of the main lines of Furth’s account of the central books of the
Metaphysics suggests that he would be in agreement with this account.
However, in “Biology and Metaphysics in Aristotle,” Robert Bolton suggests
that such an account would violate Aristotle’s explicit strictures on the
autonomy of the sciences. Each science explains different facts, and does so
by means of different principles. Biology explains biological facts by means
of appealing to biological form, and metaphysics explains ontological facts by
means of appealing to substantial form. For this reason, Bolton takes
substantial form to be a metaphysical principle, not a biological principle.
The principle of biological coming-to-be is rather to be found in the formal
motions of the progenitor’s seed, which serve as efficient cause. Does such an
account of biological principles require revision of Gotthelf’s irreducible
potential thesis? I suspect that it would, since Gotthelf takes teleological
explanation to account for more than how certain biological features come to
be; he also sees it as at work in explaining why a living thing is as it is, and
why it does what it does. We have a choice between attributing to the
Metaphysics a less strict application of the principle of the autonomy of the
sciences than what is argued for in the Posterior Analytics, on the one hand,

7

David Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?” Phronesis 36 (1991), pp.
179-96; and David Sedley, “Metaphysics Λ 10,” in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda:
Symposium Aristotelicum, ed. Michael Frede and David Charles (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), pp. 327-50.
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and limiting the scope of biological teleological explanation (as Gotthelf has
accounted for it), on the other.
Although there are points of disagreement, Gotthelf’s thoughts on
Aristotelian teleology, method, and explanation developed largely in tandem
with those of James Lennox. To a certain extent, their work can be seen as
colloborative. Lennox’s “The Unity and Purpose of On the Parts of Animals
1” furthers Gottlhelf’s work in showing that Parts of Animals 1 is far from a
hodgepodge of unrelated remarks; it is rather “a tightly integrated discussion”
(p. 60). Lennox shows how Aristotle has his eye on showing how both his
account of the varieties of causal explanation and his account of the necessity
of nondichotomous division are to be put in the service of his account of
biological methodology.
The strategy of looking to the biological works for ways to resolve
metaphysical puzzles concerning substance is implicitly challenged by Alan
Code’s “An Aristotelian Puzzle about Definition: Metaphysics Z.12.” Within
that chapter Aristotle argues that if a definition is a principle of both the unity
and the substantiality of a living substance, such a principle is to be found in
the differentia expressed in a definition, taking the form genus + differentia.
Code argues, though, that this is inconsistent with the conclusion of
Metaphysics Z.17 that it is form that is the substance of a living thing. He
suggests that Metaphysics Z.12 is a kind of reductio argument: If definition
per genus and differentia expresses the substance of a living thing, then the
substance will be differentia, which is a quality. However, substance cannot
be quality. Hence, the conjunction of genus and differentia does not constitute
the substance of a thing. The form of a living thing (i.e., its soul) is to be
understood with reference to the genus; the differentia helps us to classify a
living thing, but not to account metaphysically for its substantiality. Code’s
suggestion leaves untouched one of Gotthelf’s major theses: that identification
of basic differentiae has an explanatory as well as a classificatory function.
On Gotthelf’s view, the primary purpose of the identification of differentiae is
to enable the biologist to explain derivative attributes of a thing. Whether the
differentiae explain that thing’s substantiality is another question altogether.
In “Unity of Definition in Metaphysics H.6 and Z.12,” Mary Louise
Gill too looks to the discussions within the central books of the Metaphysics
concerning the unity of definition in order to clarify the interface between
Aristotle’s biology and metaphysics. However, she puts the pieces together in
a very different way. Metaphysics H.6 reveals that Aristotle’s central concern
in considering the unity of definition is the question of the unity of matter and
form. The differentiae, which, as Gotthelf has shown, are collected and
collated in preparation for the explanatory project, are logically independent.
Following Gotthelf, Gill argues that the goal of biological research is to show
how their unity can be explained on the basis of a teleological account of the
kind to which they belong, with reference to the way of life of organisms
belonging to that kind. This cannot be done with reference to the genus alone,
since the genus does not determine or exhaust the possible ways of life of the
kinds subsumed under it. The analogy that Aristotle is drawing in H.6 is that

155

Reason Papers Vol. 35, no. 1

the formal characteristics of a living thing are likewise to be understood as
resulting from the teleological organization of the matter that is unified by
form; these characteristics too are neither already contained in nor entailed by
the matter. Gill places great weight on Aristotle’s insistence that hylomorphic
substances are somehow (pōs) one (1045b21). The relation between genus
and differentia is fundamentally different from that between matter and form.
The genus as determined by the differentia constitutes a determinate essence,
but matter retains certain properties that are not contained in its formal
determination. This accounts for the instability and consequent mortality of
living substances.
Gotthelf’s essays concentrate on the ways in which the Aristotelian
biologist will work toward the attainment of genus/differentia definitions, and
the ways in which these are to ground the explanations of other features.
Within the second book of the Posterior Analytics, however, Aristotle
suggests that explanations themselves can ground definitions, or be
understood as a form of explanation. Much ink has been spilled on
reconciling these two accounts. Are definitions principles or explanations—
or, as Pierre Pellegrin argues in “Definition in Aristotle’s Posterior
Analytics,” both? Pellegrin shows how the Posterior Analytics is working
with two somewhat independent notions of understanding, and very sensibly
resists the temptation to account for this by asserting that different notions of
demonstration stem from different phases of the development of Aristotle’s
thought. He does not, however, take the lead of W. D. Ross and others
(including myself) in taking Aristotle to be distinguishing between two
different kinds of defined things; rather, on Pellegrin’s view, we are dealing
with two different kinds of linguistic accounts by which essences are
expressed.8
Aryeh Kosman’s “Male and Female in Aristotle’s Generation of
Animals” follows Gotthelf’s lead in subjecting the biological works to a close
reading in order to reveal what Aristotle actually says, moving beyond
traditional presuppositions concerning what Aristotle says. Aristotle’s
account of sexual reproduction is not that the mother provides the matter and
the father provides the form of the organism. Rather, the form that the father
8

Perhaps I may be forgiven for using this review to point out that the account of 2.8
93a5-8 that Pellegrin ascribes to me, and severely criticizes, is not one that I have ever
expressed or subscribed to. He quotes my translation of 93a5-6: “The account of this
is that there is some cause, and it is either the same or different.” This is a literal
translation of the text that within my book I interpret as elliptical for “it is either the
same as the thing caused or it is different from it”; see my Explaining an Eclipse:
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 2.1-10 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press,
1996), p. 102, which is Pellegrin’s understanding of the passage as well. We differ
insofar as I follow Ross in taking Aristotle to be discussing things, so that the cause in
question lies in the subject of the feature to be explained, while Pellegrin takes
Aristotle to be discussing propositions about things, so that the causes are
propositional principles and what is caused are derivative propositions.
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provides is a dunamis (what Gotthelf would call an irreducible potential) for
initiating those motions within the mother, by which she grows and bears their
offspring. This brings Aristotle’s account more in line with contemporary
biology than does the traditional understanding of Aristotle.
In “Metaphysics Θ 7 and 8: Some Issues Concerning Actuality and
Potentiality,” David Charles wonders how Aristotle’s notion of dunamis
(“potentiality” or “capacity”) can be correlative to both form and to the
composite of form and matter. Is there a single notion of dunamis at work
here? Charles argues that there are two notions. Within Metaphysics Θ it is
the latter understanding (i.e., that the actualization of a dunamis is the
form/matter composite) that is primary. Matter persists through the existence
of the composite substance insofar as no change occurs that undermines the
relevant potentiality for the composite. The actuality of the composite
substance is to be understood teleologically. (Charles brackets the issue of
how teleology is to be understood, a point on which he and Gotthelf have
significant disagreement.) Other varieties of potentiality and actuality are to
be understood as “abstractions” from this scheme.
In “Where Is the Activity? (An Aristotelian Worry about the Telic
Status of Energeia),” Sarah Broadie offers a heterodox but philosophically
fascinating account of what Aristotle means when he says that in the case of a
transitive activity (such as fire heating a stone or a teacher teaching a student)
the activity is located in the patient. Aristotle wishes to distance himself from
the Platonic view that the teleology of an action is a matter of a thing’s
reaching for an end beyond that thing (such as a separate Form). The end of
the action, and accordingly its ontological locus, is in the goal attained.
Broadie’s ideas here could profitably be integrated with Kosman’s account of
the father’s activity in biological generation.
As noted above, Gotthelf’s account of Aristotelian teleology restricts
final causes to aspects of a thing within an organism itself. The order
manifested by any whole of which the substances are parts is a kind of
epiphenomenon that does not itself constitute a kind of final cause; it arises
from the independent actions of substances. (Perhaps a parallel can be drawn
to how, on Rand’s view, civic order results from the “selfish” actions of
individual citizens.) In “Political Community and the Highest Good,” John
Cooper argues that Aristotle’s social and political philosophy is not to be
interpreted along such lines. The citizens are parts of a social whole in a
strong sense. It is not only the case that the polis (“city-state”) provides the
necessary preconditions for the virtuous activity of its members. Rather, their
activity is necessarily communal activity, just as the action of an organ is to be
properly understood as an action of a whole living organism.
One of these volumes offers a convenient way of accessing
Gotthelf’s key work. The other allows us to see how that work is being built
upon in new and exciting directions. The community of Aristotle scholars
owes its gratitude to Gotthelf and looks forward to the paths he has yet to take
in the exploration of Aristotle’s biological writings.
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